Qadr Or Taqdir - The Will Of God And The Will Of Man

By Author: Ibrahim Machiwala Lodhi
Total Articles: 463
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A great deal of misunderstanding exists as to the relation of the Divine will to the will of man. All the faculties with which man has been endowed have emanated from the great Divine attributes. Yet all human attributes are imperfect, and can be exercised only under certain limitations and to a certain extent. God is All-seeing and All-hearing; man also sees and hears, but these attributes in him bear no comparison to the Divine attributes of seeing and hearing; being only imperfect and miniature images of the perfect and infinite attributes of the Divine Being, even as the reflecting mirror of human nature is itself imperfect and finite. For the very same reason, man's exercise of these attributes is also subject to certain limitations. Man's knowledge of things, his exercise of power over things and his exercise of his will in relation to things, stand on a par. All these are subject to limitations and laws. Man's will stands in the same relation to the Divine will as his other attributes to the attributes of the Divine Being. He can exercise it under limitations, and there is a very large variety of circumstances, which ...
... may determine his choice in each case. Yet it is not true that the choice to exercise it has been taken from him; and the fact is that, notwithstanding all the limitations, he is free to exercise his will, and, therefore, though he may not be responsible to the same extent for anything done in all cases, and a variety of circumstances must determine the extent of his responsibility, which may be very small, almost negligible, in some cases and very great in others, yet he is a free agent and responsible for what he does.

The argument that man does an evil deed because God wills it so, is put into the mouth of the opponents of the Prophet on several occasions. Take the following for instance: "The polytheists will say, if God had pleased, we would not have associated aught with Him, nor our fathers, nor would we have forbidden to ourselves anything; even so did those before them reject until they tasted Our punishment. Say, Have you any knowledge so you should bring it forth to us? You only follow conjecture and you only tell lies. Say, Then God's is the conclusive argument; if He had (so) willed. He would have guided you all" (6:149-150). The polytheists' contention here is that what they do is in accordance with the will of God, and this is condemned as a mere conjecture and a lie. And against it, two arguments are adduced. The first is that previous people were punished when they persisted in their evil courses; if what they did was because God had so willed it, He would not have punished them for it. The second is that God had never said so through any of His prophets: "Have you any knowledge with you so you should bring it forth to us." And in the verse that follows, the argument is carried further: "If He had willed, He would have guided you all." The conclusion is clear. If it were the Divine will that people should be compelled to one course, that would have been the course of guidance. But men are not compelled to accept even the right way; much less could they be compelled to follow the wrong course. The Divine will is expressed through prophets who are raised up to point out what is good and what is evil, and the choice is given to man to follow the one or the other. That is clearly laid down: "Surely We have shown him the way, he may accept or reject" (76:3). And again: "The truth is from your Lord, so let him who pleases believe, and let him who pleases disbelieve" (18:29). The Divine will is therefore exercised in the raising up of prophets, and in the pointing out of the courses of good and evil, and human will is exercised in the choice of one course or the other.

It is this very law that is expressed at the end of chapter 76: "Surely this is a reminder, so whoever pleases takes to his Lord a way. And you do not please except that God please" (76:29-30). And again to the same effect: "It is naught but a reminder for the nations, for him among you who pleases to go straight, and you do not please except that God please, the Lord of the worlds" (81:27-29). It will be seen that in both these places, the Koran is spoken of as having been revealed for the upliftment of man, yet, it is added, only he will derive benefit from it who chooses to go straight or take a way to his Lord, that is, exercises his will in the right direction. Thus man is left to make his choice after God has sent down a revelation, and the will of man to make a choice is thus exercised only after the will of God has been exercised in the sending down of a revelation. If God had not pleased to reveal the reminder, man would have had no choice. Thus the words, "you do not please except that God please," mean only this that if God had not pleased to send a revelation, man would not have been able to make his choice of good or evil.